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This study develops and tests two arguments for how repertoires of political action are reconfigured in post-
communist Romania. Using multivariate statistical analysis, it examines whether citizens’ engagement in post-
communist politics is linked with generic socio-economic and attitudinal traits or alternatively, it is connected with 
selective mobilization opportunities provided by social networks and organizations. The findings reveal that while 
most Romanians are politically inactive two decades after the fall of communism, those who engage in politics do it 
selectively and their political action repertoires are largely influenced by four mobilizing agents: trade unions, 
political parties, social networks and civil society organizations. 
 
 The literature on post-communist politics generally points out a stark contrast between the effervescence of 
social movements that led to the collapse of the communist regimes and the relative apathy after the establishment 
of democracy (Letki 2003). While democratic theory posits that political engagement plays an important role in the 
equal representation of citizens’ needs and preferences in the democratic political processes, post-communist 
citizens seem to be increasingly estranged from politics. Thus, the identification of factors shaping how and how 
much citizens participate in the political sphere is important (Johann 2012) as it points to the underlying sources of  
political apathy in the region. However, research on post-communist ‘repertoires’ of political participation in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) is insufficient and this hampers our understanding of the functioning and persistence of 
democracy in this region. A frequent finding in the political behaviour literature is that citizens of eastern European 
countries participate less in politics than their western neighbours (Bernhagen & Marsh 2007). But is this difference 
simply a matter of degree of citizen participation? Or do post-communist citizens and their western counterparts also 
differ in their understanding of what political participation means and how they combine various structural 
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dimensions of conventional and nonconventional political actions? In other words, are citizens of new European 
democracies more likely to be generalists, specialists or simply apathetic in terms of political behaviour?  
 While the specialist-generalist controversy has spanned in various fields of behavioural sciences, its 
potential to generate insightful academic debates remains largely unexplored in studies of political behaviour. This 
article develops two explanations inspired and adapted from the specialist-generalist debates and applies them to an 
empirical analysis of the patterns through which post-communist citizens reconfigure their political action 
repertoires after decades of authoritarian rule in Romania.  
 Following the logic of generic activism, citizens who participate in various political activities have a 
common set of socio-economic and attitudinal traits that differentiate them from non-participants. These common 
characteristics act as strategic resources for a plethora on political actions and are commonly associated both with 
traditional forms of political participation such as campaigning, community activism and party membership (Verba 
& Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, & Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995) and also with elite-challenging actions 
such as demonstrations and strikes (Norris, Walgrave, & Aelst 2006). Within the logic of generic activism one 
would expect protesters to be also active in traditional forms of political participation since different forms of 
political action have essentially akin sources. Moreover, the motivational attitudes and social characteristics of 
protesters, party members and civic joiners should be rather similar than different (Norris, et al. 2006).  
 On the contrary, the selective activism logic’s central claim is that different forms of political actions have 
different sources that will generate more divisive citizen participation. Moreover, within this logic the type of 
voluntary organizations and social networks to which a person belongs are of utmost importance, as they can act as 
mobilizing agents and influence the range of political action opportunities of an individual. From this perspective, 
one would expect a growing specialization of citizens’ political involvement into either conventional or 
unconventional forms of participation, due to different contextual opportunities for engaging within specific political 
activities preferred by mobilizing agents such as trade unions, political parties, civil society organizations, and social 
networks. Moreover, since various types of participants have distinct characteristics and belong to different kinds of 
organisations, it is expected that those taking part in some sort of political action, usually do not take part in other 
forms of political participation.  
 In order to examine these two logics of political activism the article focuses on Romania, chosen as a 
typical post-communist society illustrating the overall decline of citizen participation in the region. Rates of political 
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participation in Romania steadily declined during the transition period typifying thus regional patterns of relative 
political apathy of post-communist citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, since in Romania political 
engagement has reached its lowest levels around the mid of the second post-communist decade, it is expected to find 
in this period any potential socio-structural biases associated with unequal citizen involvement in politics which 
might undermine the quality of democracy by subverting the ideal of equal representation of citizens' interests 
regardless of their socioeconomic status. 
This article is structured into six parts. The first section summarizes three alternative theoretical models and 
their related hypotheses commonly used in the literature to explain political participation, contrasting resource-
based, attitudinal-motivations, and recruitment-based or mobilization accounts. What are the main explanatory 
factors of political activism in post-communist Romania? How do theories developed in the western democratic 
context manage to explain political activism in the post-communist context? In the second section I conceptualise 
and explore the structural dimensions of a set of 11 political actions, based on a multivariate analysis of Public 
Opinion Barometer
1
 (BOP 2005) which provides a nationally representative cross-section sample of the Romanian 
adult population. How are various forms of political participation  empirically linked? The exploratory factor 
analysis of survey data reveals three components of citizen participation in post-communist Romania: conventional 
participation, legal protest participation and illegal protest participation. Based on these structural dimensions, a 
complex typology of political participants is built in order to substantiate the way post-communist citizens 
reconfigure their political action repertoire, namely how they combine various forms of political participation. The 
fourth section explores whether political activists are a homogeneous or a heterogeneous group of citizens and finds 
that recruitment-based factors best explain the differences between various types of participants and non-
participants. The fifth section discusses the nexus between citizens’ political repertoires and the mobilization 
potential of trade unions, political parties, civil society and social networks. How does involvement in various 
political and non-political organizations and social networks influence an individual’s propensity to participate in 
legal or illegal protest actions, or in more conventional and elite-supporting activities? The conclusion highlights the 
main findings and their implications for our understanding on how political action repertoires are reconfigured in 
post-communist societies and their consequences for democratic stability and legitimacy in the region. 
                                                          
1
 The Public Opinion Barometer (hereafter BOP) was conducted in May 2005 by Gallup Organisation Romania and 




Explaining political participation: theoretical arguments 
The existing literature on comparative politics gives different interpretations to the dynamics of political participation in 
various societies. Empirical analyses usually reveal two apparently divergent trends of the evolution of citizens’ activism: 
the thesis of political involvement decline and the thesis of shifting styles of political participation. Regarding the first 
trend, some authors found a systematic decrease of interest in politics and conventional forms of political participation in 
Western democracies (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Wattenberg, 2002). Other research relying on modernization theories 
(Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Norris 2002), supports the hypothesis of changing styles of political involvement by 
replacing and/or supplementing declining forms of traditional political participation (mainly voting, political party 
membership, campaigning, etc.) with non-conventional means of participation (protest politics, the new social movements, 
etc.). 
 Although political theory broadly views citizens’ political engagement as playing a vital role in democratic 
governance (Norris 2002), the consolidation of democracy process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was accompanied 
by an overall decline in both electoral (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova & Power 2007, p. 47; Rose & Munro 2003) and 
non-electoral forms of political participation (Barnes & Simon 1998, apud. Dalton & Klingemann 2007). While 
democratic institutions gradually consolidated in the region, civic and political activism of citizens of former communist 
countries knows an obvious setback (Inglehart & Catterberg 2002). This finding is all the more paradoxical as political 
participation is generally regarded as a benchmark for the quality of democracy in a country. From this perspective, once 
democracy takes root in a society, one would expect citizens to participate more and not less in the political process. Data 
on political participation from CEE countries seem to contradict these expectations. Moreover, the decline of political 
participation in the region seems to be part of a wider process of withdrawal of citizens from the public sphere in post-
communist states, manifested through their non-involvement in most forms of civic, associational and community 
participation (Howard 2003; Letki 2003). 
Low and declining rates of political participation have raised concerns about the quality of democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe. As Merkel (2011) has emphasized, in a high-quality democracy citizens should not only have equal 
rights to participate, but these rights should also be used in an equal manner. Low and unequal participation rates might 
undermine democracy particularly if citizen engagement is obstructed by structural constraints which can widen and 
reinforce gaps in terms of unequal political influence between those who participate and those who do not. Participants can 
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make their voice heard in the political arena and their interests have better chances of being represented in the political 
process, compared to those that do not/cannot participate. If the factors that hinder the political engagement of different 
segments of citizenry are based on unequal access to participatory resources, then the terms in which political participation 
processes take place in a democracy might not be fair (Teorell, 2006) inducing a ‘participatory bias’ based on structural 
constraints. And this compromises the principle of political equality that underlies democracy (Dahl, 1989; Verba, et al., 
1995). Thus the smaller are the socio-structural gaps (i.e. based on gender, age, education and income) between 
participants and non-participants, the more democratic participation is (Merkel, 2011). 
On the other hand, sustained political participation might have beneficial consequences for the quality of 
democracy since all persons who are subject to political decisions can shape those decisions. Moreover, if participation is 
as widespread and equal as possible it can contribute to a more equal consideration of citizens’ interests (Merkel, 2011) by 
political representatives as well as to a more equal protection of citizens’ rights from governmental abuses. In the unsettled 
political environment of post-communist societies, citizens’ engagement in both conventional and protest forms of 
political influence is all the more important for the quality of democracy as sustained participation may stimulate more 
effective popular control over the government, while rendering democratic processes more responsive, accountable and 
legitimate (Tătar, 2006). 
Direct forms of political actions that challenge decisions of political elites have played an important role in the 
collapse of communist regimes in the region (Inglehart & Catterberg 2002). However, after transitions to democracy 
formally ended, many new democracies have gone through a time of disappointment with the new political regime. Thus 
direct political action (such as demonstrations, signing petitions, etc.) decreased as citizens lost their confidence in their 
capacity to influence the political process (Inglehart & Catterberg 2002). Decline in elite-challenging actions is part of 
what Inglehart and Catterberg (2002, p. 300) have called the ‘post-honeymoon phase of disillusionment with democracy’. 
However, these authors have anticipated that in the long run, direct forms of political actions contesting public authorities 
will follow an upward trend in ‘new’ democracies as happened a few decades back in ‘old’ democracies too. 
Scholars often explain political participation decline in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe by 
disappointments with post-communist politics felt by many citizens of these states. While politically disaffected citizens 
normally do not call into question the legitimacy of the democratic system of governance, they do manifest a sense of 
political ineffectiveness, powerlessness, cynicism and do not trust political institutions, politicians and the fairness of the 
political process more generally (di Palma 1970; Torcal & Montero 2006). They might also perceive a widening gap 
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between politicians and ordinary people backed by their belief that political elites are not concerned with citizens’ welfare. 
Two different conclusions can be drawn from the literature concerning the behavioural consequences of political 
disaffection. On the one hand, studies on Western democracies highlight some positive consequences of critical 
assessments that citizens have towards the institutions and political elites, manifested by a transformation of the relations 
between governments and citizens and an increasing use of new forms of political participation (Dalton 1999; Norris 
1999). On the other hand, some authors consider that disappointments with politics are responsible, especially in new 
democracies, for citizens withdrawal from the democratic process and the emergence of uninformed and apathetic 
individuals (Torcal & Montero 2006). Using this second model of interpretation, it is expected that political 
disappointments during the post-communist transition period constitute one of the sources of political disengagement after 
1989 in Romania too. 
Beyond explaining the main trends in political participation it remains to assess the factors that lead individuals 
to participate or not into politics. Academic literature devoted to political participation reveals a number of perspectives 
from which the involvement of citizens in politics is analyzed. The institutionalist approach focuses on the structure of 
opportunities for participation offered by institutional channels and procedures. At the macro level, comparative studies 
reveal significant differences between countries on opening up to citizen participation in public affairs. This institutional 
openness can inhibit or stimulate political engagement (Jackman 1987; Powell 1986). But even within the same political 
and institutional system differences often exist between the degree of participation of the poor and the rich, between young 
and old, between those with higher education and those with primary school (Norris 2002). In this direction fall structural 
approaches underlining social cleavages based on age, gender, social status, which are closely related to resources such as 
time, money, knowledge and skills necessary to participate (Verba, et al. 1995). On the other hand, the cultural-
motivational perspective emphasizes attitudes and values that people have in the processes of political participation, 
including norms of political engagement as a civic duty, political interest, democratic values and attitudes, ideological and 
partisan identification, etc. Unlike the above mentioned perspectives, mobilization theories stress the role of agents, either 
taken individually (such as political leaders), or collectively as organizations and the social networks generated by political  
parties, trade unions, voluntary organizations and community associations that act as catalysts of participation (Rosenstone 
& Hansen 1993). To summarize, the literature review on the explanatory models of political engagement sketched above 
suggests that individuals don not participate because they cannot, they do not know how, they don’t want or because no 
one asked (Norris 2002; Verba et al. 1995). What kind of socioeconomic, attitudinal and mobilization-related differences 
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can one expect to find among various types of participants based on these theories? In the next paragraphs I will 
summarize the main theoretical arguments offered by three explanatory models of political participation as well as the 
testable propositions derived from them according to the logic of generic activism and the logic of selective activism 
presented in the introduction of this study.  
          
Models of strategic resources 
Explanations of political participation at the individual level often focus on resources that facilitate political action 
and lay the groundwork for what is called the ‘civic voluntarism model’ (Verba et al. 1995). This model includes 
status variables such as: age, socioeconomic status, education, class, residence, region, etc. (Pattie & Johnston 1998, 
apud. Comșa 2006).  Education is one of the strongest predictors of participation because it provides cognitive and 
civic awareness which helps citizens better understand politics (Norris 2002). The main thesis of the socio-economic 
model is that people with higher economic status - higher education, higher incomes, and better occupational 
positions - are more active in politics. Resources such as time, money and civic skills offer more opportunities to 
participate and so those who have such resources are more likely to be involved in politics. Many forms of political 
participation take time for information, involvement in a campaign or solving community problems and therefore 
time is increasingly becoming an essential resource for participation. Also, political activism more often requires 
money, usually in the form of support or financial contributions for certain candidates or political causes. Not least, 
citizens that have organizational and communication skills are more likely to take part in any form of political 
activity (Verba et al. 1995). Moreover, since these resources are unevenly distributed in society, they can be useful 
to explain differences in political participation related to gender, race/ethnicity, age and social class inequalities 
(Norris 2002).  
 If the resource theories are correct then according to the logic of generic activism we should expect that a 
common set of resources enable citizens to participate in various forms of political actions. Moreover, different 
types of political participants should share common socio-economic traits that differentiate them from non-
participants. On the other hand, within the logic of selective activism we should expect that different sets of 
resources enable citizens to participate in various forms of political actions and also different types of political 




Cultural and motivational models 
In addition to skills and other resources that can facilitate civic involvement, motivation is also necessary for 
individuals to become active in politics. Literature on what motivates participation usually starts from Olson's 
(1965) provocative argument according to which rational actors should not engage in collective action aimed at 
achieving a common good, unless they receive certain selective incentives. Since each individual can take advantage 
of the results of a collective action whose cost is paid by others, each individual has a rational reason to abstain and 
not pay the cost of participation. For instance, literature on voting behaviour points out this ‘paradox of 
participation’ since according to rational choice models, citizens should refrain from voting because the benefits of 
voting (understood here as a chance to give a decisive vote) are usually lower than the costs of voting (Downs 
1957). Therefore, rational choice models explain rather why people do not participate and cannot yet explain why 
much of the electorate still votes (Blais 2007). According to Olson (1965) individuals’ involvement in politics 
should be explained by reference to the notion of selective incentives - namely benefits which are obtained only 
through the personal contribution to the result of collective action. Thus, motivational attitudes can be affective, 
meaning an emotional attachment to the norms of civic involvement based on the internalization of the social norms 
of participation, for instance in the case of individuals who are conceiving participation as a civic duty or  those who 
vote out of civic patriotism. Motivations can also be expressive for people aiming to participate in order to express 
their support or to reassert their identity (ethnic, religious, ideological, etc.) and membership to a group or 
community. Also, incentives can be instrumental, generated rather by the anticipated benefits of participation 
(Norris 2002). Among the most prominent attitudes and values mentioned in the literature as influencing activism 
are: the feeling of civic duty, a sense that citizens can influence the political process (internal or self-perceived 
political efficacy), the belief that elected authorities are responsive to people’s problems (external political efficacy), 
political interest and support of the political system, including the belief that democracy is a good system of 
government, confidence in the main political institutions of representative democracy (parliament, government, 
political parties, courts, etc.), satisfaction with government performance and trust in political leaders. 
 If cultural-attitudinal theories are correct then according to the logic of generic activism we should expect 
that a common set of attitudes enable citizens to participate in various forms of political actions. Moreover, different 
types of political participants should share common attitudinal motivations that differentiate them from non-
participants. On the other hand, following the logic of selective activism we should expect that different sets of 
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attitudes enable citizens to participate in various forms of political actions while different types of political 
participants should have different attitudinal motivations that distinguish them from non-participants. 
 
Models of political mobilization 
Organizational approaches emphasize the mobilising role of agents and social networks, including political 
parties, unions, religious organizations (churches), voluntary associations, etc. in activating political engagement. 
Even among individuals with similar socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics, different degrees of political 
participation may exist because of the influence exerted by civic or political organizations (Norris 2002). These 
differences are explained by mobilization theory through the fact that in order to participate people need a catalyst 
that may be a candidate, a political activist, a party, an association, an institution or interest group. These actors are 
informed, know what are the ways and means of action which can bring benefits and therefore have every incentive 
to mobilize citizens for certain purposes (Comşa 2006). Regarding the mobilization of citizens, many studies of 
electoral participation reached the same conclusion: people who have been contacted by parties/candidates and 
asked to vote are more likely to go to the polls, even after controlling the effect of other explanatory variables 
(Comșa, Gheorghiță, & Tufiș 2010). According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) there are strong links between the 
patterns of political participation and the choices of politicians, political parties, interest groups and political 
activists. Based on longitudinal data, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue that U.S. citizens participate not because 
of personal characteristics, but mainly due to political choices and rewards offered to them in a process of 
mobilization around political controversies and opportunities.  
Besides political leaders and organizations, other important agents which may encourage political 
involvement include community groups, voluntary associations and social networks that can contribute to the 
mobilisation of colleagues, neighbours, friends or relatives in the political process. Following Robert Putnam (2000; 
1993) a plethora of studies emphasize the role of voluntary associations in fostering social and political participation 
(Alexander, Barraket, Lewis, & Considine 2012; Deth 2006; Kriesi 2008; Levi 1996; Newton 2001). According to 
Putnam's social capital theory, a wide range of heterogeneous organizations ranging from voluntary associations, 
community groups and private organizations enable face to face meetings of members and contribute to the 
production of dense civic networks that strengthen community bonds and social trust. The denser the links promoted 
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by these heterogeneous organizations and networks of relationships the more social trust will be generated. This 
‘links’ individuals, groups and communities and facilitates cooperation on matters of common interest. 
Existing literature on social capital and civil society highlights that proximity to an organization (political 
or not) has the effect of channelling individuals more or less directly into politics (Boulding & Gibson 2009; Diani 
2009; Lambright, Mischen, & Laramee 2009; Maloney, Van Deth, & Roßteutscher 2008; Miller 2009; Uhlin 2009; 
Verba, et al. 1995; Wallace, Pichler, & Haerpfer 2012; Zakaria 2013). In most direct ways, a person who belongs to 
more groups has higher odds to be politically involved as s/he has higher chances to be recruited and invited to 
participate politically. Moreover, socially involved people are more likely to recognize the relevance of politics to 
their lives, to be more interested in politics, more informed about politics, to talk more about politics and eventually 
get involved in politics, simply because they contact, meet and converse with more people than socially isolated 
persons who are most often marginalized and politically alienated. In less direct ways, organizations are, as 
Tocqueville called them ([1835-1840]/2005), ‘schools of democracy’ not necessarily because they themselves are 
models of democratic organization and functioning (actually they might not be in many cases), but because they 
help their members better understand politics, providing them with realistic experiences about how social groups 
work. Unlike socially isolated people who do not have daily experiences of negotiations, debates and argumentation, 
conflict and compromise (Woshinsky 2008), members of such organizations acquire social, cognitive and leadership 
skills that may prove extremely useful in subsequent political interactions.  
Nevertheless, different types of associations are not only likely to produce very different levels of social 
capital (Maloney, et al. 2008) but also to promote different types of political action repertoires. While I do not reject 
the argument that all voluntary forms of associations promote participation, trust and thus empowerment and this is 
the basis on which democracy can be built (see especially Putnam 1993, 2000), following van der Meer et al. (2009) 
I depart from a homogeneous understanding of social participation and find it more analytically useful to distinguish 
among different types of organizations (i.e. trade unions, civil society organizations and political parties) and social 
networks in order to examine their influence on post-communist citizens’ political action repertoire. 
If mobilization approaches are correct then according to the logic of generic activism we should expect that 
active membership in various organizations is linked to citizen participation in similar forms of political actions. 
Moreover, different types of political participants should have common organizational affiliations that differentiate 
them from non-participants. On the other hand, following the logic of selective activism we should expect that 
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active membership in various organizations is linked to citizen participation in different forms of political actions 
while different types of political participants should have different organizational affiliations that distinguish them 
from non-participants. 
 
Non-electoral political participation in Romania: conceptualization and structural dimensions 
The notion of political participation usually designates those actions by which individuals or groups are trying to 
defend and promote their interests in the political sphere. This is basically the conceptualization of participation as 
‘influencing attempts’ (Teorell 2006). The classic definition is provided by Verba and Nie (1972, p. 2, apud. Teorell 
2006): ‘Political participation refers to those activities by private citizens that . . . aim at influencing the government, 
either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel.’ 
This definition is still predominant in studies of political participation and has provided the reference for 
international research since the 1970s (Barnes & Kaase 1979; Verba, et al. 1978) until the 1990s (Parry & Moyser 
1994; Verba, et al. 1995). Its presence in most handbooks and encyclopaedias in the social sciences, confirms the 
popularity of this conception of political participation in the current academic literature (Teorell 2006). 
Participation as a way to influence policymaking significantly expands the scope of citizens’ political 
action repertoire in a democracy beyond electoral participation (Deth 2001). Thus, compared to the ‘elitist model of 
democracy’ (which resumes political participation to voting), the ‘responsive model of democracy’, to which the 
definition given above belongs, allows individuals to express preferences not only on the selection of governing 
elites (through elections) but also on policies developed by the political personnel (through non-electoral forms of 
participation and influence). Therefore, political participation is viewed as an instrumental act used by citizens who 
try to make the political system more responsive to their will (Teorell 2006). According to Verba (1996, apud 
Teorell, 2006, p. 789) ‘Participation is a mechanism for representation, a means by which governing officials are 
informed of the preferences and the needs of the public and are induced to respond to those preferences and needs.’ 
In other words, political participation is expected to ensure more responsiveness to citizens' preferences (Teorell, 
2006).  
There are various ways through which citizens can influence democratic policymaking and thus scholars 
usually examine multiple indicators to measure political participation as ‘influencing attempts’ (Bernhagen & Marsh 
2007; Harris, Wyn, & Younes 2010; Johann 2012; Kluegel & Mason 1999; Portes, Escobar, & Arana 2009; Shah, 
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Friedland, Wells, Kim, & Rojas 2012). This paper is based on a dichotomous classification of non-electoral political 
actions into conventional or traditional participation, on the one hand and unconventional or protest participation, 
on the other hand. Albeit often criticized, this division of political participation into conventional and more 
confrontational political activities is widely used in political participation studies concerning both Western 
democracies and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (Catterberg 2003; Comşa 2006; Diani 2009; 
Inglehart & Catterberg 2002; Kriesi 2008; Lamprianou 2013; Letki 2003; Opp & Kittel 2010; Uslaner 2004). In this 
paper, I further differentiate between two forms protest behaviour, namely legal and illegal protest, which might 
require different participation costs and resources and therefore might have divergent roots and patterns (Uslaner 
2004). 
I investigate conventional and protest participation (with its legal and illegal dimensions) through a 
nationally representative survey conducted in May 2005 in Romania as part of the Public Opinion Barometer (BOP 
2005) program supported by Open Society Foundation (1994-2007). This survey asks about a range of social and 
political acts of public involvement being thus well suited for a comparative investigation of conventional and 
unconventional participation. The survey asked respondents two sets of questions on political activities 
(conventional and unconventional) instrumented in the questionnaire in the form of the following yes/no items: 
‘After 1989, have you ever… contacted politicians, attended a political meeting, attended an electoral rally, signed 
civic/political initiatives?’ and  ‘So far, you have participated in any of the following forms of protest?... legal strike, 
legal protest /demonstration, signing a political petition/complaint letter, occupying buildings, blocking roads, 
joining illegal strikes, being on hunger strike’, having four response options: ‘1. Yes, 2. No, 8. Don’t Know, 9. No 
Response’. These questions were re-coded as ‘0’ if the respondents answered ‘No’, ‘Don’t Know/No response’ and 
‘1’ if the respondents have participated in that particular political activity (See Appendix for a more detailed 
operationalisation of variables).  
In Table 2 (last column), I present the figures for these forms of conventional and unconventional 
participation measures in Romania. Around three quarters of Romanians do not get involved in any of the political 
activities analysed in Table 2 (i.e. ‘the Inactives’ type), and only 14.4% of the adult population of Romania attended 
a political meeting after 1990, less than 10% participated in an electoral rally, contacted politicians and public 
servants, participated in legal strikes and demonstrations or signed a petition/complaint letter. More extreme forms 
of political participation have been practiced by less than 1% of the adult population. These figures are in line with 
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other research emphasizing low and decreasing levels of both electoral and non-electoral forms of political 
participation in Romania, after 1989 (Bădescu & Radu 2010; Badescu, Sum, & Uslaner 2004; Comșa 2006; Sum 
2005; Tătar 2011, 2013; Uslaner 2004). For instance, the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey 
(EVS) 1995-2008 datasets reveal that the share of demonstrators in the Romanian adult population declined from 
18% in 1995 to 6.8% in 2008, while the share of those who signed a petition decreased from 14.3% in 1995 to 10% 
in 2008. Less than 2% of the Romanian population has participated in contentious forms of protest such as illegal 
strikes and occupation of buildings or factories since the middle of the 1990s. 
Since few people take part in each form of political activity in Romania it makes sense to group variables 
into scales (Uslaner 2004). I performed an exploratory factor analysis for these 11 measures of political activity 
using SPSS Statistics 19. The exploratory factor analysis (Principal Components method, Oblique rotation, KMO = 
0,778, total variance explained = 56.33%) structured the political participation acts into three structural dimensions 
(see Table 1): legal protest (sum of squared loadings after rotation = 2.61) illegal protest (sum of squared loadings 
after rotation = 2.15) and conventional participation (sum of squared loadings factor after rotation = 2.26).
2
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2
 To test the robustness of the construct validity and reliability of the political participation measures and their 
dimensional structures, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was carried out on similar indicators of political 
participation gathered in Romania in 1990 and 1998 within the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe in 1990-2001. Cumulated Survey Data (Rotman et al. 2004). While on data collected immediately after the 
collapse of communist regime in Romania (1990), PCA grouped all protest actions into a single dimension, by the 
end of the first post-communist decade (1998), analyses revealed a clear split of protest action into 2 different 
dimensions: legal and illegal protest. This bi-dimensionality of protest actions was confirmed by the PCA carried out 
on data collected in 2005. The empirical differentiation of legal and illegal protests could be the result of a process 
of specialization of participants and adoption of a particular repertoire of protest actions, a process that took place in 
the early years of democratic experience. Thus, some participants in protest activities have gradually moved to and 
prefer legal political actions, while others are more in favor of illegal ones.  
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The factor analysis grouped the 11 variables concerning political activities into three main components of 
political participation. Thus contacting a politician, attending a political meeting, and participating in election 
rallies have higher factor loadings into the conventional participation dimension; participating in a lawful strike, 
attending a protest/march/legal demonstration, signing a complaint, signing civic/political initiatives
3
 have higher 
loadings in the legal protests dimension;  occupation of buildings, blocking roads, hunger strike
4
, illegal strikes 
have higher loadings in to the illegal protests dimension of political participation. The factor scores obtained by 
Principal Component Analysis for conventional participation, legal protest and illegal protest dimensions have been 
saved as three new variables and added to the original dataset. These ‘factor scores variables’ have been then 
grouped by a two-step Cluster Analysis (log likelihood distance measure, BIC clustering criterion) into five groups. 
The five clusters of respondents have been saved as a categorical variable containing the five types of participants 
(i.e. five values ranging from 1 to 5) presented below in Table 2, and serves as the dependent variable of this study. 
  
Types of participants and political action repertoires in post-communist Romania 
As mentioned above, the notion of ‘political participation’ encompasses multiple ways in which citizens can make 
their voice heard in the political process. In examining political engagement scholars focus on one or several 
participatory acts separately, or on cumulative indices and dimensions that underlie ‘various modes of political 
activities’ (Johann, 2012, p. 47). While such research strategies are useful for analysing the factors associated with 
participation in a specific political activity or mode of participation (i.e. conventional vs. protest), they are 
unsuitable for examining citizens’ repertoires of political action that might comprise various forms of activities. The 
purpose of this section is to build a complex typology of participants which can reveal, as Johan (2012, p. 47) has 
suggested, ‘whether and how people combine different modes of participation’. The repertoires of actions analysed 
here are thus based on the potential involvement of citizens in both conventional and protest (legal and illegal) forms 
                                                          
3
 Signing civic initiatives is not necessarily a form of protest but since in Romania such political activities were 
mainly promoted by civil society organizations as a means to control/reform an unresponsive political system, 
signing civic initiatives is more strongly associated with other forms of elite challenging actions.  
4
 Hunger strike is not illegal in itself (in the sense that it is not prohibited by law) but in the empirical analyses is 




of political action (see Table 2). Despite obvious cultural and temporal differences, the types of participants 
resulting from the cluster analysis on Romania 2005 BOP data converge to those proposed by Kaase and Marsh 
(1979, pp. 154-155) in a comparative study across five nations (Austria, Britain, the Netherlands, Federal Germany 
and the USA). 
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In post-communist Romania the classification of individuals according to their participation in different 
political activities reveals the following types, listed here in order of their proportion in the population:  
The Inactives, representing 74% of the total population, are persons who are neither involved in 
conventional or in unconventional (protest) forms of political participation. Their political involvement resumes 
at most at voting in elections or following political news on television. 
The Conformists (about 10% of the population) are those that get involved only in conventional forms of 
political participation (48% said they had contacted a politician, 80% have attended a political meeting, 23% 
attended an election rally). Conformists are generally people who feel closer to a political party and therefore, not 
particularly surprising, they participate in forms of political action usually mediated and promoted by political 
parties. 
The Contesters (about 9% of the population) are those whose repertoire of political actions is limited to 
legal forms of protest (64% have participated in a legal strike, 27% in a protest march or demonstration, 42% 
have signed a petition or complaint letter). If they decide to go to polls, the contesters are usually more pragmatic 
and individualist voters compared to the conformists (in the sense they do not feel particularly strong partisan 
identification so that they vote usually depending on circumstances) and do not contact at all politic ians. 
The Reformists (5% of the population) engage in conventional forms of participation (56% have 
contacted a politician, 87% have attended a political meeting, 70% have participated to an electoral rally, 46% 
have signed a political initiative) but their repertoire also includes legal forms of protest (52% have participated 
in a legal strike, 71% to a lawful demonstration, 54% have signed a petition/complaint). Reformers are a 
combination of conformity (i.e. conventional participation specific to the conformists) and contestation (i.e. legal 
protest participation specific to the contesters). 
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The Complete Activists (2%) are an extremely small minority of the adult population that is 
characterized by intense and comprehensive political involvement that goes even to non-legal or illegal forms of 
political action. However the preferred forms of political participation in this group remain acts of protest, be it 
legal or illegal (legal strike 76%, illegal strike 68%, legal demonstration 54%).  
 
The profile of participants: who they are and how different they are? 
What factors best predict individuals’ belonging to a certain category of participants? To answer this question I 
nuanced the profile of the types of participants by multivariate analysis. Multinomial logistic regression is a 
statistical technique suitable for this purpose as it helps determine the characteristics that best distinguish the 
five types of participants/non-participants: the inactives, the conformists, the protesters, the reformists and the 
complete activists. I have started the analysis with a complex statistical model with 38 predictors that can be 
broadly divided into three main categories derived from the explanatory models presented in the literature 
review section: strategic resources, attitudinal motivations and mobilization-related factors. Many of these 
predictors (most of them belonging to the ‘strategic resources’ and ‘attitudinal motivations’ models) had no 
statistically significant influence, unduly hindering further interpretation of data. To facilitate a comparison in 
terms of the predictors that best distinguish between these types of participants, I have built a simpler model 
which still succeeds to explain a significant proportion of the variance of the dependent variable  (i.e. types of 
participants). Thus, I excluded all variables that had no statistically significant influence, and after I went 
through a series of intermediate models, I have reached a reduced model including only statistically significant 
predictors.  
The reduced model evaluates the predictions of belonging to one of the five types of participants 
(dependent variable) based on 12 predictors (independent variables): age coded in four categories 18-29, 30-
49, 50-65, over 65; an index of personal modernity composed of the number of known foreign languages and 
computer literacy skills; an index of social connectedness summing the number of ‘relations’ available to 
individuals to solve various issues in different situations (it is used as a proxy to a person’s social network); an 
index of trust in national political leaders; an index of political discussion frequency; an index of political 
knowledge; an index of satisfaction with the country's political and economic system (degree of satisfaction 
with democracy and market economy in Romania); an index of political interest; subjective political 
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competence (agreement with the statement ‘I am better informed about politics than most people’), 
participation in trade union activities after 1990; participation in the actions of other civil society 
organizations since 1990; participation in the activities of political parties after 1990. A more detailed 
description of these predictors/indexes is presented in the Appendix. 
The model produced a significant differentiation between the five groups of participants based on the 
12 predictors [χ2 (7084, N=1800) = 2442.10, p = 1, deviance criterion], the variance explained by the model 
being R
2 
(Nagelkerke) = 0.433. The model correctly classified 78.2% of all cases. The inactives were correctly 
identified in 97.7% of cases; the conformists were identified correctly in 26.9% of cases, the protesters in 
18.2% of cases, the reformists in 32% of cases, and the complete activists in only 2.7% of cases. There was a 
tendency to incorrectly classify cases of the least numerous categories, to the largest category (i.e. the 
inactives). 
Table 3 around here 
 
Table 3 shows that the 12 predictors have unequal individual effects on explaining the variance of the 
dependent variable. Depending on the impact on improving the prediction of belonging to one of the five types 
of participants we can distinguish between three classes of predictors: with large impact (participation in trade 
union activities after 1990, participation in party activities since 1990 and individuals’ social connectedness), 
medium impact (participation in activities of other civil society organizations since 1990, political knowledge, 
satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and market economy in Romania, the frequency of discussions 
on political topics, personal level of modernity measured here as foreign languages skills and computer 
literacy), low impact (subjective political competence, political interest, trust in national political leaders and 
age).  
Therefore, membership in one of the five types of participants is best predicted by previous 
participation in the activities organized by trade unions and other civil society associations , involvement in the 
activities of political parties, and social connectedness (measured here as the number of relationships 
individuals can rely on in different situations). These predictors suggest that ‘political mobilization’ is the 
model that best explains belonging to different types of participants. According to this model, individuals 
engage in a form or another of political participation mainly because they are mobilized in this process by 
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different agents: collective ones (i.e. trade unions, political parties and civil society organizations) or 
individual ones (politicians, friends, neighbours, family members, etc.). 
Table 4 presents the multinomial logistic regression coefficients, Wald χ2 test , statistical significance, 
odds ratio Exp (B) and the limits of the 95% confidence interval of for Exp (B). The reference category of the 
dependent variable is the inactives. Data presented in Table 4 allow comparisons between different types of 
political activists, according to various characteristics. We note that some predictors have a stronger effect on 
some types of participants than others. These differences will be discussed below, first as comparisons between 
each type of participants and the inactives and then by pointing out differences between types of participants 
themselves, according to the 12 predictor-variables (7 numeric and 5 categorical) presented above in this 
section. 
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The Conformists vs. The Inactives 
 Conformists (about 10% of total population) are those who have a higher propensity to participate in 
activities organized by political parties, than the general population. For instance, compared to the inactives 
(representing almost two thirds of the total population), conformists are almost 17 times more likely (1/0.059) to 
have participated in activities organized by the political parties, after 1990. They also have significantly higher 
numbers of relationships in different spheres of social life, connections that can be used to solve issues related to 
different fields: health care, legal, administrative and financial issues, business, getting a job, etc. 
In addition, conformists are a relatively attentive public to political phenomena that discuss about politics 
more frequently and have more objective knowledge about politics than the inactives. Moreover, conformists are 
almost 2 times (1/0.507) more likely to consider themselves better informed about politics (subjective political 
competence) compared to the inactives. Generally, they are persons with a higher degree of personal modernity (in 
terms of knowledge of foreign languages and computer literacy) and are more involved in the activities of civil 
society organizations. No significant differences in terms of age and participation in trade unions’ activities can be 
noted between the conformists and the inactives. 
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On the other hand, conformists are people somewhat more dissatisfied on how democracy and the market 
economy work in Romania, compared to the inactives. However, they tend to have more confidence in national 
political leaders than the inactives. In other words, conformists are relatively unhappy with the workings of the 
political and economical systems, but at the same time, have more confidence in political leaders than those who do 
not engage at all politically. Their relative dissatisfaction with how things work in the country, combined with trust 
in political leaders and the potential solutions proposed by these leaders, could provide an incentive for conformists 
to engage in political participation acts, particularly conventional ones (i.e. contacting politicians or officials, 
participation in a political meeting or an electoral rally), precisely because these behaviours can be conceived both 
as ways to protect and promote their own interests (through requirements addressed to political representatives), and 
also as a  form of support for public authorities. Thus, conformists are somewhat dissatisfied persons who believe 
that their problems can be solved using the conventional channels of participation (particularly those resulting from 
partisan affiliation or proximity to a political party) offered by the existing institutional setup. 
 
The Contesters vs. the Inactives 
 Unlike the conformists (who are close to political parties), contesters (about 9% of the population) are 
mobilized to legal forms of protests by trade unions and other civil society organizations. Therefore, their political 
action repertory includes especially strikes, participation in marches or demonstrations of protest, signing petitions 
and complaint letters. Compared to the inactives, contesters are over 11 times more likely to have participated in 
trade unions’ actions and over 2.5 times more likely to have participated in the actions of other civil society 
associations, after 1990. They are not significantly different from the inactives in terms of participation in the 
activities organized by political parties: about 99% of the inactives and about 98% of the contesters saying they have 
not participated in the activities of political parties, after 1989. Moreover, contesters and inactives are not 
significantly different in terms of interest about political affairs and frequency of discussions about politics. 
Although, there are no significant differences between contesters and inactives in terms of self-perceived 
political competence, contesters generally have higher levels of political knowledge (measured by an index of 
objective knowledge). Moreover, they have a higher degree of personal modernity. Also, age is one of the predictors 
that significantly differentiate contesters from the inactives. Thus, contesters are more likely than inactives to be part 
of rather younger or adult generations (18-29, 30-49, 50-65) and not the older category (over 65 years). The biggest 
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differences are in the age category of 30-49 years, the contesters are four times more likely than the inactives to be 
from this age category, all other things being equal.     
 In terms of the overall assessment of the political-economic system, contesters are like conformists: they 
have a relatively higher degree of dissatisfaction with how democracy and market economy work in Romania, than 
the inactives. In addition, like the conformists, the contesters tend to be more confident in national political leaders 
than the inactives. Beyond these similarities, contesters differ fundamentally from conformists by the types of agents 
which mobilize them to participate politically and by means of political action. The conformists’ proximity to 
political parties is crucial for their mobilization in conventional forms of elite-supporting political participation, 
while trade union and other civil society organizations’ membership are key factors to mobilize the contesters in 
legal protest political actions. Thus, conformists and contesters do not primarily differ in terms of strategic resources 
needed for participation (i.e. political knowledge, political trust and interest, or degree of personal modernity), but in 
terms of the organizations in which they activate and which mobilize them politically. 
        
The Reformists vs. the inactives  
The reformists are a relatively small public (about 5% of adults) made up of people interested in politics, 
discussing more frequently on political issues and also having more political knowledge than the vast majority of 
population made up of inactives. To the latter, reformists have a higher degree of personal modernity and benefit of 
more personal relationship they can rely on in different situations. However, there are no statistically significant 
differences between the reformists and the inactives concerning their confidence in the national political leaders, nor 
in terms of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and market economy in Romania, controlling the effect 
of other variables in the model. Unlike the conformists, reformists seek to influence public authorities not only by 
conventional means of participation (specific to conformists) but also through legal protests (specific to the 
contesters) thus putting additional pressure on political leaders in order to obtain the outcomes that would have not 
been achieved solely by conventional methods. Hence, in terms of forms of political action, reformists are a mixture 
of conformity and contestation. 
The hybrid political action repertoire of reformists is emphasized by their involvement both in the actions 
that benefited political parties after 1990 (e.g. political meetings, election rallies, signing political initiatives) and in 
those organized by trade unions or other civil society associations (legal strikes and demonstrations, signing 
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petitions/complaints of protest). Compared to absolute activists which are politically mobilized rather by unions or 
civil society organizations, reformers frequently participate in actions organized by political parties and also vote 
more frequently in elections. 
  
 Complete activists vs. the inactives  
 Complete activists represent that very small minority (about 2% of adult population) whose repertoire 
includes all three forms of political participation: conventional, legal and illegal protest. Complete activists do not 
differ significantly from the inactives neither by level of personal modernity, trust in political leaders, political 
knowledge or subjective political competence, nor by frequency of political discussions or age, controlling the effect 
of other variables in the model. What differentiates them fundamentally from politically inactives is the fact they are 
connected to those social networks and are part of those organizations that can crystallize their interests and can 
channel their action for attaining certain purposes. In other words, compared to the inactives, complete activists have 
an organizational vehicle that can help them recognise and pursue group interests
5
 in the political sphere. Thus, 
activists have participated in much higher proportions in the actions of trade union and also of other civil society 
organizations, after 1989 than the inactives. At the same time, they have more personal relationships to rely on in 
different situations, but are generally more dissatisfied with how democracy and market economy works in 
Romania. Moreover, complete activists are relatively more pessimistic than the rest of the population regarding the 
improvement of their personal welfare in the near future (next 12 months). Political dissatisfaction combined with 
the lack of hope that, in the short term, their problems will be solved might increase the complete activists’ 
availability to engage in all forms of political participation, but especially in the protests, including illegal ones. 
 
Political Action Repertoires and Mobilizing Agents 
In post-communist Romania, we can notice certain degrees of specialization of political activism depending on the 
organizations and social networks individuals belong to. The most important factors that differentiate the types of 
participants analysed above are related to the mobilising agents who direct individuals to specific forms of political 
action. Thus, individuals’ odds to engage in protest actions (legal or illegal) significantly increase if, in the past, they 
have participated in trade unions. Compared with unions’ impact, other civil society organizations (ranging from 
                                                          
5
 Adapting the Marxist terminology, they have the organizational vehicles to acquire group/class ‘consciousness’. 
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environmental to human rights ones) have a much lower potential for mobilizing citizens to protest. In contrast, 
those who have participated in political parties after 1990 have much higher chances to currently engage in 
conventional forms of participation (contacting politicians, election rallies, supporting party initiatives).  
   However, some organisations are more clearly oriented towards political issues than others and, as noted 
above, these organizations promote different political actions repertoires. Overall, civil society associations in 
Romania have a relatively low capacity to mobilize citizens in actions of any kind and especially in acts that fall 
within the sphere of politics (Badescu, et al. 2004). In addition, not only their mobilizing potential is different but 
also their political actions repertoire varies. Unions are perhaps the best example of not explicitly political 
organizations, which have a relatively strong capacity to mobilize their members in politically-relevant actions, 
compared with other civil society organizations. Even if trade unions do not necessarily have direct political aims, 
they are powerful mobilizing agents in protest actions, especially when their members are recruited from employees 
working in the public sector. This is so because unions have the ability to activate what we might call the political 
‘consciousness’ of public sector unionists by showing them both that their interests are directly affected by 
governmental decisions and also how those decisions can be influenced by collective action. Consequently, where 
unions are strong, union members are more involved in politics, their voice is better heard in the political sphere, 
their interests are better represented in politics and implicitly, the decisions affecting them will be more favourable 
(i.e. better working conditions, higher wages, longer leaves, etc.) than in places where unions are weak and lack 
organizational capacities and political mobilizing force (Woshinsky 2008, p. 94). 
Political parties are classical examples of organizations that have direct impacts on citizen involvement in 
politics. In this study, party activism ranked second, after trade unions, in terms of the importance of the predictors 
that differentiate the five types of participants presented in Table 2. This may seem surprising at first sight, 
especially considering the fact that political parties assume immediate political purposes, including policy making 
functions. However, political participation defined as ‘influencing attempts’ is not confined to conventional political 
actions (i.e. contacting politicians, attending an electoral rally or a political meeting, signing a political initiative, 
etc.) which can be interpreted as forms of support for parties and politicians in particular, and for the democratic 
system in general. In the conceptualization used in this article, political participation also includes elite-challenging 
actions, namely legal or illegal protests, which people use to contest decisions made by public authorities or to claim 
and protect certain rights. Taking into consideration this complexity of political action repertoires it becomes more 
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straightforward to understand that unions may have greater overall influence than parties as agents of political 
mobilization mainly because Romanian political parties focus particularly on voter mobilization strategies during 
election campaigns and generally promote conventional forms of political participation. 
Yet, unions might have an overall advantage over political parties as agents of political mobilization not 
only because their political action repertoires are more diverse but also for reasons that relate to the post-communist 
context. In the new European democracies, partisanship (meaning here attachment to political parties) has weak 
social roots and seems to be a variable endogenous to the political process which highly correlates with other 
political factors such as interest in politics and trust in political institutions due to several reasons (Tătar, 2013). 
First, as Tufiș (2010) has emphasized, the almost instantaneous emergence of political parties in post-communist 
societies excludes the formation of strong attachments to them through political socialization, leaving only direct 
experience as a possible source of identification with a particular political party. Thus, attitudes towards parties in 
new democracies are more volatile and vulnerable to critical evaluations of their current (mainly economical) 
performance as parties in government. Second, the initial post-communist transition period was characterized by an 
increased instability of the party systems and this did nothing but to delay the formation of strong attachments to 
political parties. Moreover, political parties along with the new institutions of representative democracy have been 
blamed for the economic hardships and deterioration of living standards affecting significant parts of the population 
as a result of structural changes and economic reforms during the post-communist transition. These developments 
along with pervasive perceptions of political corruption have contributed to relatively low and decreasing levels of 
party identification in this region. Not surprisingly, ‘partisan’ has become a pejorative term for citizens and 
politicians alike not only in Western societies as Katz and Mair (2009) have noted, but also in post-communist 
democracies. Distrust of party politics and the perception of a growing gap between parties and the wider society 
might have left more room for alternative social actors acting as agents of political mobilisation. While trade unions 
in Romania are nevertheless entangled to a certain degree with political parties and union leaders were protagonists 
of notorious corruption scandals, union membership and levels of popular trust in unions have remained higher than 
in the case of political parties during the last two decades. 
However, the mobilization capacity of these organizations should not be exaggerated. In Romania only a 
relatively small proportion of the adult population belongs to or expresses closeness to these organizations (i.e. trade 
unions, NGOs and parties) and their ability to mobilize citizens outside the relatively small circle of members and 
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supporters is extremely low. For instance in 2005, about 16% of Romanian adults have been members of a civil 
society organization, about 12% were members of a union and only around 5.5% of a political party,
6
 since 1990. 
Moreover, in Romania organizations of all kinds usually only manage to mobilize their own members, having thus 
an extremely small impact outside their contributors. For example, of those who participated in trade union 
organized actions after 1990, over 95% were union members. This is not surprising given the fact that unions are 
organizations that aim to protect and promote the rights of employees they represent, and therefore have no interest 
or incentives to bring to their actions masses of un-unionized persons. On the other hand, unions’ ability to mobilise 
even their own members is quite low. Of those who were union members since 1990, only about 60% had 
participated in collective actions organized by unions in the post-communist period.  
In terms of mobilisation strategies, unions and political parties seem to be somewhat similar, although one 
would expect their target audiences to differ both in size and features. Professionally-based unions tend to involve in 
their collective actions only union members and this seems reasonable since, in general, only union members will 
benefit from the results of union actions. Surprisingly, a similar pattern occurs also in the case of political parties, 
which are organisations that usually seek and need broad popular support to win the elections, gain governmental 
positions and then stay in government. Thus, among those who participated in the actions of parties after 1990, 
almost 91% were party members. On the other hand, among those who were party members after 1990, about 70% 
have participated in party-organised actions. A lower mobilisation potential of their members is registered for civil 
society associations: only 60% of their members took part in actions of the organizations they were part of. As in the 
case of unions and political parties, civil society organizations are unable to expand their mobilization capacity 
beyond their own members. Among those who participated in actions of civil society associations since 1990, over 
95% were members of those organizations. 
Beyond formal membership in organizations, informal social networks play an important role in promoting 
political participation. People better connected socially, with many relationships in various fields, are more 
politically involved than those with fewer connections. Involvement in several informal groups can produce 
supportive relationships or even friendships. The higher the number of these positive relationships, the stronger the 
sense of self-esteem a person will have. Involvement in many social relationships is also associated with a more 
pronounced sense of social competence and also subjective political competence (i.e. those who consider themselves 
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 Data based on BOP, May 2005. 
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better informed about politics than the general public). In turn, subjective political competence is one of the 
predictors discussed above for significantly differentiating the types of participants, but is also relatively strongly 
associated with an increased interest in politics, a higher frequency of political discussions and more objective 
knowledge about politics. 
 
Conclusions 
Although political theory broadly views citizens’ political engagement as playing a vital role in democratic 
governance, in Central and Eastern Europe the consolidation of democracy process was accompanied by an overall 
decline in both electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation. Establishing the roots and patterns of 
political disengagement is important due to the valuable insights it can provide for understanding democratic 
persistence and the avoidance of authoritarian regressions in this region. This paper has found that citizen 
participation in the post-communist context is not as much influenced by individuals’ socio-economic and attitudinal 
characteristics. Instead, it is highly contingent on recruitment or mobilization related factors. This means that the 
nature and degree of political participation is strongly influenced by political and non-political organizations and 
social networks to which citizens belong or are close to. These organisations or networks largely act as politically 
mobilizing agents and frame citizen participation into more elite supporting or more elite-challenging ways of 
action. In the absence of strong participatory political cultures it seems that the quality of post-communist 
democracies largely depends on the democratic goals and methods pursued by these mobilising agents. Moreover if, 
depending on contextual and organisational opportunities for political mobilisation, ‘participants can be both radical 
and mainstream, anti-state and pro-state’ regardless of their socio-economic status and motivational profile, as 
Norris et al. have suggested (2006, p. 302), then the study of such mobilizing agents and their political action 
repertoires can  provide important insights into their potential for both challenging and strengthening democracy.    
This paper explored the political action repertoires of post-communist citizens in Romania and found three 
structural dimensions of non-electoral political engagement, namely conventional participation, legal protest 
participation and illegal protest participation. Based on participation along these three structural dimensions, I have 
distinguished between five types of citizens: the inactives (74% of the Romanian adult population), the conformists 
(10%), the contesters (9%), the reformists (5%) and the complete activists (2%). These findings suggest that, in 
terms of structural dimensions, the types of participants and the way they combine various conventional and 
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unconventional political actions seem to converge in old and new European democracies. This further implies that 
post-communist citizens and their western neighbours have similar understandings on what political participation 
means and what are the major channels of public voice in a democracy. Yet there seems to be a difference in terms 
of degree of participation. Namely the actual share of citizens participating in each mode of political action might 
considerably vary across countries, citizens of eastern countries being in general less engaged than their western 
counterparts (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007). Post-communist Romania illustrates these patterns of low and declining 
political involvement in new European democracies, since almost three quarters of its citizenry are not engaging in 
any form of political actions besides voting in elections.   
The paper has also examined the importance of different explanatory models of political activism derived 
from theories mainly developed in the context of western democracies. In the changing circumstances of Romanian 
democratic consolidation, the factors associated with political participation are not mainly based on socioeconomic 
resources or motivational attitudes (i.e. socioeconomic status, political attitudes and skills) but on ‘recruitment-
based’ factors, namely political mobilization exerted by various organisations (see also Sum, 2005). Therefore it 
seems that socioeconomic inequalities do no substantially bias political engagement in Romania. This finding 
appears to be in line with regional patterns of low levels of political participation which do not necessarily 
undermine the democratic quality of political processes in post-communist Europe (Kostelka, 2014). On the other 
hand, political mobilization theories posit that individuals engage in politics not primarily due to their 
socioeconomic traits but because they are mobilized in this process by various agents. Using Romania as a typical 
post-communist case, I have compared the mobilizing potential of four such collective actors: trade unions, political 
parties, civil society organizations, and social networks.  
The increasing importance of politically mobilizing agents has its own implications for the political action 
repertoires in post-communist Romania. I find a growing specialization of citizens’ political involvement into either 
conventional or unconventional participation forms, and this is linked to different contextual opportunities for 
engaging within specific political activities preferred by the mobilizing agents. Thus, the chances of individuals to 
engage in protest actions (legal or illegal strikes, demonstrations, marches, etc.) greatly increase if they are active 
members of trade unions. Compared with trade unions, other civil society organizations (ranging from 
environmental organizations to human rights protection NGOs) have a much lower potential to mobilize citizens in 
protests. Usually, active membership in such civil society organizations is associated with more civic and legalistic 
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ways of participation and issuing policy recommendations to public authorities. In contrast, those who were active 
members of the Romanian political parties after 1990, have a much better chance to currently engage in 
conventional forms of participation (contacting politicians, election rallies, supporting legislative initiatives of 
political parties). However, it should be noted that in Romania only a relatively small proportion of the population 
belongs to or is close to these organizations (i.e. trade unions, NGOs and parties) and their capacity to mobilize 
citizens outside the relatively small circle of members and supporters is extremely low.  
In addition, our data show that there is a very weak association between citizens’ participation in more 
forms of political action and this is linked to a weakened civil society peculiar to post-communist contexts (Howard, 
2003) and to low degrees of cross-cutting membership in different organisations which could stimulate engagement 
in various public arenas. Usually, those taking part in some sort of political action, do not take part in other forms of 
participation. Thus, our data do not support the logic of a ‘generic activism’, according to which people who have 
the resources and inclination to participate tend to be involved in all forms political activities, radical or mainstream, 
whether organized by civil society, trade unions and political parties.  
Although we have identified in our data sets individuals who engage in more forms of political action, their 
share is extremely low among the Romanian population. On the contrary, 20 years after the fall of communism, 
most Romanians are no longer involved at all in politics, not even in the act of voting, as shown by data from the 
2008 and 2012 parliamentary elections when turnout was around 40%. However, those who engage in politics do it 
selectively. As seen above, our data support the logic of ‘selective activism’ which implies some degree of 
specialization in different types of political actions based on the social groups and organizations individuals belong 
to and also according to the participatory repertoire these organizations promote.   
In other words, it seems that in post-communist Romania political engagement is not primarily based on the 
self-selection of individuals in participatory processes, but rather on their recruitment and mobilization by various 
organizations and networks. This questions the ability and willingness of post-communist citizens to act 
autonomously in the new democratic processes. Further comparative studies might elucidate if this is part of a 
persistent communist legacy of the ‘obedient-citizen’ designed by the authoritarian regimes of Central and Eastern 
Europe, or it belongs to a broader syndrome of political disaffection based on a widening confidence gap between 
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The statistical analyses presented in this article are based on a dataset of a nationally representative survey 
conducted in May 2005 in Romania as part of the Public Opinion Barometer (BOP, 2005) program supported by 
Open Society Foundation (1994-2007). Fieldwork consisted of face-to-face interviews which have been carried out 
at respondents’ domiciles during 6-19 May 2005. The survey has the following methodological features: a. Sample 
size: 1800 persons aged 18 and over; b. Type of sample: stratified, probabilistic, three-stage stratification criteria: 18 
cultural areas according to historical provinces, residence (urban - rural), urban size (4 types), the development of 
the rural areas (3 categories); c. Representativeness: the sample is representative of for the adult population of 
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Romania, with an error margin of ± 2.3% at a confidence level of 95%. Data has been collected by the Gallup 
Organization Romania. 




Dichotomous variable obtained by recoding the variable Q140 concerning subjects’ 
agreement with the following statement: ‘I am better informed about politics than most 
people,’ having the following answer options: 1. True; 2. Rather true; 3. Rather False; 
4. False; 8. DK; 9. NA. The new variable was recoded with 1 (the responses with ‘true’ 
and ‘rather true’) and 0 (the rest of responses). 
Index of political 
knowledge 
Index summing up the number of correct answers to ten questions (Q74-83) ranging 
from knowledge of political leaders holding certain positions in the state, various 
features of the electoral system, to NATO and EU membership 
Index of political 
discussion 
Summative index of variables Q102-103 on the frequency of political discussions with 
people who have the same political orientations and with people having different 
political orientations, respectively. 
Index of political interest Summative index consisting of 7 items (Q67-73): ‘How interested are you in the ...?: 
Political life in your city; Romania's political life; Parliamentary elections; Electoral 
campaigns; Political information; Personal discussions on political issues; Reading 
about political issues.’ Responses: ‘4. Very much; 3. Much; 2. Little; 1. Very little; 0. 
At all.’ Responses with ‘8. DK/9.NA’ were coded as missing values and replaced with 
the average of the index. Thus, the additive index has a values ranging from 0 to 28. 
We tested the dimensionality of the 7 items composing the index by exploratory factor 
analysis (Principal Axis Factoring method, KMO = 0.898, a single factor was extracted 
explaining 73% of variance). The resulting index of political interest has high 
consistency/reliability (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.949). 
Index of trust in national 
political leaders 
Summative index of variables Q92-101 on the level of trust in the main national 
political leaders measured on an ordinal scale with 5 values ranging from 0 (none) to 4 
(very much). Responses with ‘7.Do not know her/him; 8. DK 9. NA’ were recoded with 
the value 2 (the median value of the trust scale). Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability index = 
0. 817 political leaders. The index has values ranging from 0 to 40. 
Index of personal 
modernity 
Summative index of variables Q312-314, Q316 on knowledge of foreign languages and 
variable Q320 on the ability to use the computer. Variables were recoded to 1 for 
foreign language skills / ability to work with the PC, or 0 for the other choice. 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of personal modernity index = 0.645. The index takes a 
value from 0 to 5. 







The following variables Q145 (attending a political meeting), Q146 (contacting a 
politician), Q147 (participating in a protest, march, demonstration), Q148 (signing a 
petition / policy initiatives), Q149 (attending an election rally), Q158 (signing a 
complaint) Q159 (participation in strikes/ legal demonstrations), Q160 (participation in 
strikes / demonstrations illegal), Q161 (occupying buildings/factories), Q162 (blocking 
streets), Q163 (hunger strike) were recoded into new variables with value ‘1’ if the 
subject reported that s/he realized that action and ‘0’ for the rest the answer variants. 
Following factor analysis of the 11 new variables (Principal Components method, 
oblique rotation, KMO = 0.778, total variance explained 56.53%) three 
factors/dimensions have resulted: legal protest (sum of squared loadings after rotation 
= 2.61) illegal protest (sum of squared loadings after rotation = 2.15) and conventional 
participation (sum of squared loadings factor after rotation = 2.26). 
Contacting politicians, attending a political meeting and participating in election rallies 
have the highest factor loadings in the conventional participation dimension. 
Participating in a legal strike, legal demonstrations and marches, Signing a political 
petition/complaint letter, and signing civic/political initiatives have the highest factor 
loadings in the legal protest dimension. 
Occupying buildings, blocking streets, hunger strike and Illegal riots have the highest 
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May 2005 
factor loadings in the illegal protest dimension. 
Index of social 
connectedness (relations) 
Summative index of Q220-228 variables which were recoded into new variables with 
value ‘1’ if the subject said s/he has a ‘relation’ to solve various issues in different 
situations and 0 for the other possible answers. Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for index 
of social connectedness = 0.797. The index takes a value from 0 to 9. 
Index of satisfaction with 
democracy and market 
economy in Romania 
Summative index of Q24-25 variables measuring satisfaction with democracy and 
market economy in Romania. Responses were recoded (subtracting 1 from the original 
values) so that the new variables had values on a five-level ordinal scale from 0 (very 
dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). The responses with  ‘8.DK/9.NA’ were recoded to 2 
(‘neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied’). Cronbach’s  Alpha coefficient for the Index of 
satisfaction with democracy and market economy in Romania = 0.785. The index 
values range from 0 to 8. 
Types of participants 
(Dependent variable) 
Factor scores obtained for conventional participation, legal protest and illegal protest 
dimensions of political participation (see above construction of these variables through 
exploratory factor analysis) were grouped by a two-step Cluster Analysis (log-
likelihood distance measure, BIC grouping criterion, number groups: 5). The 
respondents have been grouped into five types of participants: the inactives, the 
conformists, the contesters, the reformists, and the complete activists. The reference 
category in multinomial logistic regression analysis is the inactives.  
Age Age recoded in four categories: 18-29, 30-49, 50-65, over 65 
Participation in trade 
union activities after 1990 
Dummy variable (recoded from Q156-157): ‘1’=Yes and ‘0’=No  
Participation in the 
actions of civil society 
organizations since 1990 
Dummy variable (recoded from Q156-157): ‘1’=Yes and ‘0’=No. Civil society 
associations include: civic and human rights organizations; environmental groups; 
associations of owners/tenants; religious associations; church choirs; sports groups; 
other association/NGO. 
Participation in activities 
of political parties after 
1990 




STRUCTURAL DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA 
 Variables: Modes of political participation 
 
 







Legal strike .797    .635 
Legal demonstrations, marches .709    .623 
Signing a political petition/complaint letter .645    .434 
Signing civic/political initiatives .482    .428 
Occupy buildings  .786  .626 
Block streets   .718  .555 
Hunger strike   .675  .453 
Illegal riots   .607  .493 
Contacting politicians    .863 .733 
Political meeting   .795 .705 
Election rallies   .497 .512 
Sum of squared loadings after rotation 
Total variance explained = 56.33% 
2.61 2.15 2.26  
Note: Data in columns 2, 3 and 4 represent factor loadings. Loadings <0.40 were not presented in order to make the 
interpretation of the results more straightforward. 





TYPES OF PARTICIPANTS AND POLITICAL ACTION REPERTOIRES IN POST-COMMUNIST 
ROMANIA 


























Contacting politicians  0  48  0  56  32  8.6  
Political meeting  0  80  8  87  43  14.4  











0  3  7  46  35  4.1  
Legal strike  0  2  64  52  76  9.9  
Legal demonstrations, 
marches  
0  3  27  71  54  7.6  
Signing a political 
petition/complaint letter 









 Occupy buildings  0  0  0  0  30  0.6  
Block streets  0  0  0  0  38  0.8  
Hunger strike  0  0  0  0  8  0.2  
Illegal riots  0  0  0  1  68  1.4  
Note: Data represent % of those who said that, after 1990, they had participated in that specific political action form, 
within each type. The first line includes the percentage (%) of each type of participants within the adult population 
in Romania, 2005. 
Source: own elaboration based on BOP, OSF (May, 2005).
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TABLE 3  
MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE TYPES OF PARTICIPANTS - THE 
IMPORTANCE OF THE PREDICTORS 
Predictors 
Model Fitting Criteria  Likelihood Ratio 
Tests 
 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
the reduced model 
χ2 df Sig. χ2 /df 
Constant 2442.103 .000 0 . . 
Participation in trade unions’ activities after 
1990 
2561.492 119.389 4 .000 29.847 
Participation in political parties’ activities after 
1990 
2518.837 76.733 4 .000 19.183 
Index of social connectedness (relations) 2486.926 44.823 4 .000 11.206 
Participation in the actions of other civil society 
organizations after 1990 
2468.889 26.786 4 .000 6.696 
Index of political knowledge 2462.666 20.563 4 .000 5.141 
Index of satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy and market economy in Romania 
2460.882 18.778 4 .001 4.695 
Index of political discussions 2460.249 18.146 4 .001 4.536 
Index of personal modernity  2460.169 18.066 4 .001 4.516 
Subjective political competence 2454.821 12.718 4 .013 3.179 
Index of political interest  2454.269 12.166 4 .016 3.041 
Index of trust in national political leaders 2452.924 10.820 4 .029 2.705 
Age (18-29, 30-49, 50-65, 65+)  2465.164 23.060 12 .027 1.922 
Note: χ2 is the difference in -2 log likelihood of the final model and the reduced model. The reduced model is 
formed by omitting an effect (of the variable in question) from the final model, the null hypothesis being that 
all parameters of that effect are equal to 0. The statistical significance threshold used is of 0.05 . 







MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE TYPES OF PARTICIPANTS/NON-PARTICIPANTS – 
PARAMETERS’ ESTIMATES  
Dependent Variable – typology of participants 
with 5 categories: inactives, conformists, 
contesters, reformists, activists 
B Wald 
χ2 
Sig. Exp(B) 95% confidence 





















Constant -.124 .025 .873       
Index of personal modernity .263 7.427 .006 1.300 1.077 1.571 
Index of trust in national political leaders .035 5.448 .020 1.035 1.006 1.066 
Index of social connectedness (relations) .287 39.988 .000 1.332 1.219 1.456 
Index of political knowledge .174 11.572 .001 1.190 1.076 1.315 
Index of satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy and market economy in Romania 
-.145 5.946 .015 .865 .770 .972 
Index of political interest .015 .772 .380 1.016 .981 1.051 
Index of political discussions .087 14.464 .000 1.091 1.043 1.142 
Subjective political competence 
No -.680 10.635 .001 .507 .337 .762 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in trade union 
activities after 1990 
No -.627 2.903 .088 .534 .260 1.099 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in political parties’ 




48.214 .000 .059 .027 .132 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in the actions of 
other civil society organizations 
after 1990 
No -.754 8.125 .004 .470 .280 .790 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Age 
18-29 -.497 2.017 .155 .608 .306 1.208 
30-49 -.060 .048 .827 .942 .550 1.613 
50-65 .005 .000 .984 1.005 .585 1.729 

















Constant -.658 .470 .493       
Index of personal modernity .241 5.834 .016 1.273 1.047 1.548 
Index of trust in national political leaders .035 5.479 .019 1.036 1.006 1.067 
Index of social connectedness (relations) .085 2.464 .116 1.089 .979 1.211 
Index of political knowledge .116 5.335 .021 1.123 1.018 1.240 
Index of satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy and market economy in Romania 
-.208 11.790 .001 .812 .721 .914 
Index of political interest .010 .335 .563 1.010 .975 1.047 
Index of political discussions .028 1.422 .233 1.028 .982 1.077 
Subjective political competence 
No -.219 .900 .343 .803 .511 1.263 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in trade union 




80.940 .000 .090 .053 .152 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in political parties’ 
activities after 1990 
No -.644 .901 .343 .525 .139 1.985 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in the actions of 
other civil society organizations 
after 1990 
No -.944 12.568 .000 .389 .231 .656 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Age 
18-29 1.139 6.546 .011 3.124 1.305 7.475 
30-49 1.446 13.433 .000 4.244 1.959 9.193 
50-65 1.164 8.148 .004 3.202 1.440 7.120 
65+ 0 . . . . . 
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Dependent Variable – typology of participants 
with 5 categories: inactives, conformists, 
contesters, reformists, activists 
B Wald 
χ2 
Sig. Exp(B) 95% confidence 



















Constant -.865 .714 .398       
Index of personal modernity .456 14.349 .000 1.578 1.246 1.998 
Index of trust in national political leaders .034 2.410 .121 1.034 .991 1.079 
Index of social connectedness (relations) .240 15.561 .000 1.271 1.128 1.432 
Index of political knowledge .247 10.180 .001 1.280 1.100 1.490 
Index of satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy and market economy in Romania 
-.119 2.081 .149 .888 .755 1.044 
Index of political interest .081 9.673 .002 1.085 1.031 1.142 
Index of political discussions .086 6.648 .010 1.090 1.021 1.163 
Subjective political competence 
No -.541 3.418 .064 .582 .328 1.033 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in trade union 




48.861 .000 .092 .047 .180 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in political parties’ 




46.169 .000 .043 .017 .107 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in the actions of 





22.209 .000 .238 .131 .432 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Age 
18-29 .108 .040 .842 1.114 .385 3.225 
30-49 .440 .944 .331 1.552 .639 3.767 
50-65 .573 1.606 .205 1.774 .731 4.302 





















Constant .102 .005 .942       
Index of personal modernity .227 1.671 .196 1.255 .889 1.773 
Index of trust in national political leaders -.006 .051 .821 .994 .941 1.050 
Index of social connectedness (relations) .247 9.041 .003 1.281 1.090 1.505 
Index of political knowledge .065 .432 .511 1.067 .879 1.295 
Index of satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy and market economy in Romania 
-.284 6.440 .011 .753 .604 .937 
Index of political interest .064 3.491 .062 1.066 .997 1.140 
Index of political discussions .052 1.420 .233 1.053 .967 1.147 
Subjective political 
competence 
No -.646 2.563 .109 .524 .238 1.156 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in trade union 




42.052 .000 .069 .031 .154 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in political 




3.478 .062 .215 .043 1.082 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Participation in the actions of 
other civil society 
organizations after 1990 
No -.989 4.625 .032 .372 .151 .916 
Yes 0 . . . . . 
Age 
18-29 .210 .080 .778 1.233 .288 5.285 
30-49 .578 .933 .334 1.783 .552 5.762 
50-65 .361 .335 .562 1.434 .423 4.864 
65+ 0 . . . . . 
Note: Data represent the results of a multinomial logistic regression model with the dependent variable types of 
participants, with five categories: apathetic, conformists, contesters, reformists, absolute activists. Inactives is the 
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reference category. Exp (B) coefficients are odds ratios: values higher than 1 represent a positive effect, values 
below 1 represent a negative effect. The statistical significance of coefficients is presented in column Sig. For 
nominal or ordinal predictors, the reference category’s parameter (the last category of each nominal variable) is set 
to 0, because it is redundant. Example of reading data: conformists, compared to the inactives, are 0.507 times less 
likely to not consider themselves more competent on political matters than most people; or vice versa, conformists, 
compared to the inactives, are almost two times (1/0.507 = 1.97 ) more likely to claim they are more competent on 
political matters than most people. 
Source: own elaboration based on BOP May 2005 data. 
 
 
 
 
